Data is the cornerstone of the modern academic industry, like a constant production line of 3 consumable goods packaged with a veneer of statistical techniques. Biomedical and 4 psychological sciences invert the traditional logic of the physical sciences where hypotheses 5 were tested against data rather than data against hypotheses. This is likely to reflect the 6 immaturity of the new paradigms that barely cope with the data output of a precocious 7 enterprise. However, the current state leads to distortions of the practice of science and 8 entrenchment of its dysfunctional politics reflected in the science itself. With the debate now 9 on the reproduction of data and statistical sleights of hand accompanying many if not most 10 studies, what is lost in the debate is the preeminent role of good theoretical discovery. This is 11 partly as a result of the structure of funding, the nature of reporting in biomedical fields based 12 on the symbiotic relationship of high ranking institutions and journals. Open access could fill 13 a gap in traditional publishing literature which has entrenched a culture of highly restrictive 14 practices at a time when revolutionary science is required. OA is not in danger of lowering 15 the standards of science as its critics claim as the studies on non replication show that they do 16 not discriminate against OA papers specifically. Because it is 'open' to new and radical ideas 17 that would never see the light of day otherwise, it may well provide a rejuvenating energy. 18
Introduction 22 23
In her essay on the crisis of replicability Spellman (2015) notes a revolution of sorts: a 24 political one, but not scientific. Her failure to recognize it as part of the current process for a 25 scientific revolution in the psychological sciences reflects a broader lack of concern for the 26 nature of the data generating enterprise and only spells out the crisis in terms of quality 27 assurance. There is however, something intrinsically wrong with the entire project of 28 scientific research as currently practiced and its narrow pursuit of data collection. This data 29 driven concern is paralleled by traditional journal policies where the ongoing impetus is to 30 publish more and better data as a means to scientific enlightenment. This approach fails to 31 take into account the historical means by which science has made progress in large leaps 32 In the neurosciences it is as much about presenting new paradigms that wouldn't see the light 44 of day if traditional means of publication stood unchallenged. Thus, it is a necessary part of a 45 political shift in scientific control, a step for progress in science which has become rather 46 stale, repetitive and dominated by a restricted set of agendas. These agendas have barely 47 offered solutions, in spite of the prestige of provenance and venues of expression, to a 48 number of outstanding questions in science. The most obvious is the mind-body problem and 49 its significance for the single most outstanding issue in the psychological sciences. Thus, 50 record, even though history in the physical sciences dictates that theory and data can be 125 generated by separate sources. Indeed, as is argued elsewhere those that produce data are not 126 often the best placed to construct good theory. Although traditional subscription journals can 127 publish theory, these are often 'allowed' to high profile individuals of whom historical 128 precedents teach us are much less likely to produce revolutionary ideas. Many of these 129 individuals are well placed as members of journal editorial staff and can police the 130 distribution of ideas that may be in conflict with their own. Expertise in this sense manifests a 131 double-edged sword, those apparently best placed to decide on innovative ideas are those 132 with the greater motivation to suppress challenging ideas. Or, to take a non-conspiratory 133 angle, might even miss significance because they are unduly wedded to a standard, albeit 134 dysfunctional model. 135
136
The pursuit of data and its generation appears to offer little relief from an ossified system and 137 by its very nature follows the dictates of precedent studies at small incremental levels. 138
Innovation in theory is far more threatening to the status quo and might explain why it has 139 been marginalized, even though progress in science cannot function without it. Uncovering 140 bad data found to be supported by statistical sleights of hand wont necessarily change this 141 self-serving culture because there is less incentive that might be believed to reduce the 142 number of even poorly designed studies. After all, if we remove a conservative 50% of 143 studies from the traditional literature as potentially non replicable, that represents a not 144 insignificant threat to the academic food chain. That is, even with the best intentions there 145 remains an inherently insurmountable conflict of interest. Good theory alone can change the 146 data generating enterprise into a more productive process, but not before it seriously 147 challenges entrenched hierarchical interests and the way it is disclosed to the scientific 148
community. 149
OA appears, at least currently, to show a greater tolerance for hypothesis papers from lesser 151 status sources precisely because they are currently less organized into rigid hierarchical 152 structures. Although, several OA venues exclude hypothesis based submissions, OA is not a 153 monolithic enterprise where all advocates have the same objectives. The irregularities in 154 publishing criteria are important here for revolutionary science. Such attempts by several 155 publishers to emulate subscription journal policies reflect the the greater status (read here: 156 predicated on broader acceptance) of experimental papers, but represents a similarly 157 restrictive practice in one sense. They are none the less far more inclusive and allow greater 158 liberties to theoretical speculation in their discussion sections. The role of OA in this 159 endeavor is a reaction to an innate conservatism that has entrenched itself in prestigious 160 journals. Youth could well be a key element in this process harking back to a paraphrasing of 161 Max Planck's famous statement of progress being made by one funeral at a time. 'alchemist's' claim of transforming data into scientific knowledge is the ubiquitous use of 167 functional neuroimaging and the lack of real meaning of many of the findings, which 168 resemble a cognitive phrenology, a common criticism (Faux 2002) . However, there is an 169 unwarranted belief that this will be addressed by "large-scale data mining approaches" and a 170 network mapping-type of phrenology repackaged as a 'cognitive ontology' (Friston 2002 ; 171 Poldrack 2010). One might rephrase this as a dualist scientific research project. 172 173 error rate of 5% the standard parametric statistical methods to be conservative for voxel-wise 175 inference and invalid for cluster-wise inference for both single subject and group studies 176 (Eklund et al. 2012; . The authors suggest a non parametric solution to false positives. 177 However, with some 28,000 published papers according to PubMed (fMRI in the title or 178 abstract) and parametric tests of the null hypothesis being a common method of analysis, the 179 question arises not so much whether the findings for many studies are now implied to be 180 obsolete, but whether if this is the case, it dramatically changes our understanding of 181 cognition i.e. is it likely to seriously challenge the known theoretical foundations of 182 psychology? I would argue probably not. This is not because fMRI studies add nothing of 183 value to the investigation of cognition but because as discussed below, there is an insufficient 184 theoretical edifice in the first place. 185
186
It is interesting to first briefly discuss what is actually assessed by these fMRI studies. The 187 language is one of 'blobs' (clusters of fMRI generated voxels) and looking at significant of data and observation. The models themselves are rather implausible and lack elegance, but 226 no alternatives are proffered or at least those that are are barely discussed or promoted even 227 though they may be better. Why? The current state of affairs actually reflects the dominance 228 of correlational theories of consciousness, which are essentially dualist. 229
230
The latest glam technology to assail neuroscience is optogenetics. Its touted revolutionary 231 capacity has led to imminent claims of nobel prizeworthy discoveries. It has taken some time 232
for doubts to emerge with regard to its specificity in determining neural function (confirming 233 that no neuron is an island) and confidence now only exists for those findings that 234 corroborate previously known functions from the crudest of tools, lesion studies (Südhof 235 2015) . Like other techniques it appears that this methodology is prone to the same caveats of 236 other means of study i.e. it is unlikely in itself to 'illuminate' unponderable questions. 237
Compare this premature exuberance with the ground and space projects LIGO and LISA, 238 designed to detect the existence of gravitational waves, a prediction made close to a century 239 ago. There is a far more random application of technologies in neuroscience and clinically 240 than the scientific community would perhaps admit. In fact, taking this latter example the 241 technology makes sense only in the context of the theory. 242
243
This also underlies the problem faced in the pursuit of genetic signatures of complex mental 244 disorders as alluded to at the start of this introduction. Genome-wide studies often 245 demonstrate multiple and varied polymorphisms of minor significance where very large 246 cohorts and statistical sophistication have largely been failures. The common excuse is that 247 most of these disorders are polygenic and thus, no one mutation adequately correlates to risk. 248
But even when mutations of a large effect size are found in a family cohort such as the 249 DISC1 in schizophrenia and well-defined syndromic cases of autism, where the genetic 250 abnormality has been well-defined and replicated in animal models, good theoretical models 251 are conspicuously absent. The latter examples if anything, imply that accumulation of more 252 data will not alone determine solutions. The relative failure of the genomics of mental 253 disorders puts paid in turn to a commitment to big data mining as an alternative paradigm for 254 scientific discovery. In part this results from the confluence of multiple genetic pathways. 255
256
The problem with the general type of proselytizing to the cause of more and ever expansive 257 data sets is that there ultimately must be a confluence in mechanistic aetiology between 258 genes, relevant pathophysiology and studied behavior. This level of explanation will not 259 come from the data sets themselves though as the crystallographic example shows, but 260 requires a level of creativity that even eminent philosophers of the history of science 261 themselves struggled to explain. 262
263
The practice of data generation creates a rigid food chain with those at the top having little 264 incentive to change it. The enterprise thus described has little need for a useful scientific 265 outcome and can and does function in parallel to real progress. If one accepts this there is 266
little surprise that such a massive proportion of studies fail replication and as long there is a 267 perceived effort of correcting the record the system can continue to function as it is. In other 268 words, motives that drive it are not scientific but careerist. The elimination of spurious results 269
does not necessarily correlate with progress in science. The concept of an ecological food 270 chain is critical to understanding why it is so difficult to move outside standard scientific 271 practice and to perceive and adopt better models that can propel a line of study. 294 with low acceptance rates does is relieve the scientific community of having to sift through 296 unnecessarily a large amount of low quality papers and that any potentially good work that is 297 missed will be in the minority. This misconception is embraced by those proponents of the 298 current hierarchical structure of journal impact factors with traditional peer review. What it 299 fails to recognize is that it also represents a tool for the control of the ideological landscape 300 and it is highly unlikely that altruism guides the motives of peer reviewers with a stake in this 301 power structure. 302
303
In fact, the claim here is that the main impetus for open access is not so much for free 304 availability of state-funded studies, but the hiatus in ideas left by these controlling stakes. 305
Science self-regulates and the traditional enterprise has not met the expectations of a 306 burgeoning community both as outlet, but also for a failure to provide powerful principles 307 that make science successful beyond careerist imperatives. 308
309

Distortions in the art of science 310 311
What this means and is generally not acknowledged, is that it is not simply a matter of more 312 data or better data or even replication, as important as these regulating activities appear to be 313 (Nosek 2012) . It is about the efficiency of the data, that is the targeting of new heuristic 314 principles of research. The research enterprise now requires innovative paradigms based on 315 better theories. This is the major anomaly in traditional, by subscription literature i.e. a 316 disconnect between the manufacturing of data and its interpretation. Hypotheses are generally 317 poorly developed and do not accommodate a wealth of findings, either intra-or inter-318 disciplinary. Most often data drives hypotheses rather than the reverse case, where good 319 theory creatively spawns experimental design. There are pending questions to solutions, 320 which data as an instrument just can't solve. 321
322
This argument parallels somewhat that made about distorted statistical intuition and the 323 importance of informed judgment in comparing Bayesian statistics to the predominance in 324 psychology of a mechanical null hypothesis significance testing (Gigerenzer 1993 
338
Although a very interesting exercise in uncovering disingenuous statistical aberrations, the 339 focus of investigation in the romantic-priming papers is unduly narrow. Risk-taking is a 340 complex behavioural phenomenon and to simplify the parameters, often necessary to reduce 341 covariates to find statistical associations, is also likely to lead to much wasted effort. although, such analysis ignores sociopolitical reasons for publication above those of ensuring 353 valid data. However, even as critical appraisal is available in some journals it tends to be a 354 secondary concern, a shortcoming in itself. 355
356
In fact, it is far more difficult to create good theory that can generate good data and most 357 hypotheses form a post script at the end of papers. New theory is practically censured in 358 traditional journals. Generally, their purported reach is rather tame lest it trouble peer 359 reviewers and compromise chances of acceptance. Worse it desperately attempts to show 360 support or otherwise for often outmoded and simplistic models of reputed significance. Good 361 theory in the mind and even biomedical sciences has yet to achieve the status of venerable art 362 as in physics, but the scientific community still seems to ignore more fundamental causes of a 363 disconcerting malaise, believing that better statistics not better theories will remedy all. 364 365 Quite apart from the lack of corroboration of quality based on IF as measured by replication 366 and the matter of increased retraction rates in these journals, which are used as counter-367 arguments to the cultivated impression of superiority, the malaise of science is more 368 fundamental. The underlying presumption that looks to maintain the status quo is that 369 indirectly. But it can be easily surmised by anyone who has submitted an article to a 454 traditional or high IFJ only to to be directed to well established theories that one is required to 455 pay homage to to even have a chance of their paper being seriously considered. 456
457
The reason why similar initiatives in the life sciences as in the physical sciences have so far 458 been met with a muted response are complex and surely include a relative immaturity in 459 some fields, but also the importance of value addition to the proposed publication of data that 460 can trade on the prestige of a group or lab than the heuristic value of the study itself. Some 461 researchers are in a better position to achieve the endorsement of 2-3 reviewers than open 462 their data to the science community in general, which by way of publication has achieved its 463 main goal even prior to open assessment. By ensconcing the data in a few well-traversed 464 threads of theoretical explanation at start and end of a paper, the custodians of the field in 465 
514
The GABA theory of ASD is an ideal example of theory serving data rather than a converse 515 situation and is based on a theoretical premise initially encapsulated as an increased ratio in 516 ASD between excitation/inhibition (Rubenstein & Merzenich, 2003) . It is extended to similar 517 interpretative rationales of other data generating studies so that GABAergic dysfunction of 518 inhibition is a simile for not only perceptual, but also spatial suppression deficits (Foss-Feig 519 et al, 2013). This pervasive 'metaphorical' form of mind-body theory is pernicious and almost 520 always very limited in its application to particular data sets. Distinguishing metaphorical 521 explanations is the first step in delineating what constitutes bad theory. The structure of the 522 poor argument is linguistic: a simile becomes a metaphor becomes explanation, becomes 523 canon. Certainly that's then becomes an impediment to publishing alternative ideas because 524 editors and peer reviewers are not likely to 'bite the hand that feeds' and other non-scientific 525 sociological factors such as prejudice, naivety, deference etc. 526 527 Paradoxically, limited but diverse data sets can lead sometimes to an apparent proliferation of 528 ideas, but these are generally restricted to, or surround idiosyncrasies of the methodology 529 used in particular experiments. Reading the literature can give a false impression of 530 competing views in science, but these actually rarely intersect in any meaningful way and 531 seem to dominate in parallel, self-interested readership i.e. research subgroups. Examples are 532 theory of mind (ToM) and EEG or fMRI based regional cortical coherence studies. Surely, 533 such incoherence is a sign of pre-paradigm. A caveat is the extension of the concept to open 534 science, which includes post publication reviews on sites like PubPeer. These debates, 535 however are generally limited to detection of fraud not an analysis of the merits of particular 536 theories. 537 538 'Mock' theories designed to shape research agendas rather than true discovery are endemic in 539 science. After all, dominance in a field requires at least a semblance of commanding the 540 theoretical space. Of course the ideological landscape is more uneven than this analysis 541 suggests and there are many examples of models that attempt to understand the data being 542 produced. Generally, they are redescriptions of observations, albeit often useful. Examples of 543 these are theory of mind (ToM) deficits in autism or the structure of the visual hierarchy in 544 terms of ventral and dorsal streams. They are part of the piecemeal process in data 545 public availability of methodology and data, proper consideration of statistical methods and 568 the gold standard: independent replications. The met-analysis also includes effect sizes and 569 confidence intervals. 570
To the non-statistician the debate may appear opaque, esoteric even because the discussion 572 revolves around the relative merits of novel statistical techniques. It is easy to miss however, 573 that what is actually at stake here is the decisiveness of statistics as scientific method 574 precisely because it is vying for proof of concept in uncovering pseudoscience. In principle 575 this seems like a reasonable assumption. It remains unlikely though that statistics alone will 576 result in resolution, if no other reason that it is very difficult to control multiple confounds 577 and a broader appeal to plausibility or lack thereof will be required. 578
579
The prominence of the debate in conservative academic circles serves to illustrate an 580 extreme, but perhaps inevitable conclusion to a data-driven bodiless research culture (mind 581 without body). Plausibility itself will depend on emergence from a pre-paradigmatic stage 582 and resolution of the mind-body problem rather than belief systems as to what constitutes a 583 valid science, not perhaps as an absolute proof against psi, but as a better model of science 584 discovery. This also applies to the specious argument of scaling quantum effects to 585 behavioural observations, which has generally proved a popular, but poor heuristic for 586 understanding the mind sciences and mental illness. 587
588
The meta-analysis excludes non-significant studies that address awareness of a potential 589 retroactive stimulus (Bem et al. 2015) . Significant results are restricted to implicit stimuli, but 590 there is no a priori reason for this convenient decision on the part of the authors. After all, 591 rehearsal prior to a recall test does improve performance. There is also an unwarranted 592 assumption that "conscious cognitive strategies" might "counter their (retroactive stimuli) 593 attitude-inducing effects". But biases can also exist implicitly and conversely, participants 594 may well explicitly accept precognitive effects. 595
Big science and the role of myth-making 597 598
With a lack of commitment to theoretical discovery by the elite academic-journal 'complex' 599 that dissuades independent propositions, the role of theory as myth-making becomes 600 indispensable. Non-explanatory correlational analysis of genetic studies mimics its role in 601 The apparent success of the endeavour is subsequently codified by the eminence of the 611 institution conducting the study, the journal in which it is published and the surrounding 612 media including social rhetoric. It is difficult to clearly identify exact causes for why 613 individual players in the game of promotion identify with a particular study, but might 614 include institutional or personal theoretical and methodological self interest. Further, if this is 615 the methodological landscape one is trained up in there is also a likely implicit and 616 unquestioning acceptance of the form this science takes, a kind of loyalty that refers more to 617 the sociology of human behaviour than relevance to scientific innovation. (singular nuclear polymorphism) in schizophrenia, raising C4A profile (Sekar et al., 2016) . 621
The SNP is associated with increased synaptic pruning in a mouse model. Complement 622 factors can be elevated in schizophrenia. However, reduced neuropil, a consequence of 623 increased synaptic pruning, is non-specific to several disorders, both psychiatric and non-624 psychiatric. Autism is classically associated with reduced neuropil in a number of cortical 625 areas. Specificity, then for the schizophrenia cohort hinges on direct relative risk ratios, small 626 as they are, coincident effects on timing of florid symptoms in late adolescence or early 627 adulthood, and an ill-defined association with reduced cortical grey matter, a common post 628 mortem finding. Faith in the power of the tools particularly if technically proficient becomes 629 a proxy for conceptual development or even the logic behind plausibility. But the structure of 630 the claims parallels those discussed for autism, with a relatively simple and graspable 631 storyline. 632
633
These type of signals emanating from the literature are often spurious. Consider however, the 634 possibility that C4 is a real effect. Its possible relation to the disorder refers to a secondary 635 but heightened immune response commensurate with increased synaptic pruning. None the 636 less the primary abnormality remains undefined and is responsible for the specificity of the 637 disease process. The immune response in itself is non-specific and possibly marginal, as 638
shown by low effect size and the model makes no attempt to explain any of the core 639 symptoms or endophenotypes, as if it could. 640
641
What does non-specificity of immune response mean in the context of a potentially 642 significant correlation? By adding to disease burden a case will meet quantitative and/or 643 qualitative criteria, but for a number of different disorders. For example, an increase in the 644 null allele frequency of C4B was shown for both autism and schizophrenia (Rudduck et al. 645 1991; Warren et al. 1985) . Although, biochemical pathways are likely to be complex this 646 mirrors C4A/C4B ratio effect of the nature study. Further null C4B allele was found in 28 647 percent of normal controls in the autism study. It is illustrative that both these studies are 648 between 2-3 decades old. The failure to integrate a presumably significant finding highlights 649 the inadequacy of hypothesis-free science methodology to move the science in a productive 650 
683
The premise for greater openness is that even with the authoritative power of a finding in a 684 HIF journal it rarely translates into a compelling theory irrespective of the perceived standing 685 of its authors. Original proponents who come to command the intellectual space associated 686 with the dissemination of ideas are resilient irrespective of productivity in the progress of 687 research agendas. There is certainly a strong case to be made that the technical innovators in 688 a field shouldn't have as much power over the scientific mind because rarely do they provide 689 an ongoing heuristic that proves as productive for the field as their achieved status suggests. 690
In fact, it appears to hinder the emergence of better ideas coming from elsewhere explaining 691 their own data. Ownership of data published in HIF journals has the unfortunate effect of 692 giving the right to set research agendas, but mostly based on modest theory. 693
The cause of data is distorting 695
696
The distortions of science are compounded by the problem that the gold standard of 697 replication is more troublesome than it is generally believed even when motivated by the 698 integrity of the exercise (Pulverer, 2015) . So the same sources of error may be levelled at 699 negative findings and confidence in the absolute authority of non-replicating studies is not 700 straightforward (Morrison et al., 2014) . Pulverer states of replication: 701
702
"The aim has to be to formally publish only those scientific findings for which we have compelling 703 support".
705
But this is unlikely to suffice for the reasons stated here and in the same article and there is a 706 danger of not publishing what will be eventually discovered to be valid and important 707 findings. So part of the solution might be: to publish where there is compelling theoretical 708 support i.e. data comments on good theory, but where this is lacking to encourage critical 709 discussions of the merit of individual ideas. The danger remains that apparent agreement on 710 the guiding principles of dominant theoretical models rests more on the limits imposed by the 711 authoritative structure, which takes on an aura of being factual and is difficult to disengage 712 from both politically and intellectually. This in spite of the usual criticisms of inelegance or 713 an accumulation of anomalies from the outset. 714
715
Yet the data driven culture of HIF publication behaves contrary to this apparent discrepancy 716 allocating discretionary and privileged access to the means of communicating to a broader 717 scientific community by a difficult right of passage. The latter is often dictated by influential 718 mentorship and is for all practical purposes a sine qua non of a successful career. 719 historical precedent, but to make the case for OA as a revolutionary tool for theoretical 771 development of a data driven culture. It is a fascinating case study in the preparadigmatic 772 science in which we are immersed and the reason many players behave as if oblivious to this 773 fact. The case still needs to be remade in the current context and with all the details of 774 mechanisms that define resistance and the the sociopolitical sources thereof. It is also a time 775
for prospective employment of these insights. Perhaps current methodology is even more 776 insidious than in past centuries because the modern psychological sciences function with all 777 the high tech trappings of a real science as if good paradigmatic infrastructure is superfluous. 778
The naïve underlying presumption is that more and better data will unlock the secrets of a 779 field and this myth is propagated by an exclusive hierarchy. 780
781
A lack of adherence to initial intent means that the language of paradigms has partly lost its 782 significance and fosters a reductionist science of narrow interests and ideologies. Although, 783 one may argue that Kuhn's paradigms were not defined as an absolute and allowed the 784 emergence of a narrower perspective there are key broader questions in science which must 785 be answered before progress in that science is deemed proper or in the case of the 786 psychological enterprises, that a science even exists. 787
788
There are obviously many teething problems and the resistance to OA is more than an issue 789 of quality assurance, but one of fear of having one's dominance usurped by new and non-790 can offer it beyond traditional means of doing science. This is not merely naïve thinking and 794 it is readily acknowledged that like a good Marxist theory OA can be usurped for less than 795
